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Abstract
Recommender systems are personalized information access applica-
tions; they are ubiquitous in today’s online environment, and effective
at finding items that meet user needs and tastes. As the reach of
recommender systems has extended, it has become apparent that the
single-minded focus on the user common to academic research has ob-
scured other important aspects of recommendation outcomes. Prop-
erties such as fairness, balance, profitability, and reciprocity are not
captured by typical metrics for recommender system evaluation. The
concept of multistakeholder recommendation has emerged as a unifying
framework for describing and understanding recommendation settings
where the end user is not the sole focus. This article describes the ori-
gins of multistakeholder recommendation, and the landscape of system
designs. It provides illustrative examples of current research, as well
as outlining open questions and research directions for the field.
1 Introduction
Recommender systems provide personalized information access, supporting
e-commerce, social media, news, and other applications where the volume of
content would otherwise be overwhelming. They have become indispensable
features of the Internet age, found in systems of many kinds. Even search
engines, the most fundamental web applications, have become increasingly
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personalized in their provision of results, to the extent that they can also be
considered recommender systems.
One of the defining characteristics of recommender systems is person-
alization. Recommender systems are typically evaluated on their ability to
provide items that satisfy the needs and interests of the end user. Such focus
is entirely appropriate. Users would not make use of recommender systems
if they believed such systems were not providing items that matched their
interests. Still, it is also clear that, in many recommendation domains, the
user for whom recommendations are generated is not the only stakeholder
in the recommendation outcome. Other users, the providers of products,
and even the system’s own objectives may need to be considered when these
perspectives differ from those of end users. Fairness and balance are impor-
tant examples of system-level objectives, and these social-welfare-oriented
goals may at times run counter to individual preferences. Sole focus on
the end user hampers developers’ ability to incorporate such objectives into
recommendation algorithms and system designs.
In addition, in many e-commerce retail settings, recommendation is
viewed as a form of marketing and, as such, the economic considerations
of the retailer will also enter into the recommendation function [93, 110].
A business may wish to highlight products that are more profitable or that
are currently on sale, for example. Commercial recommender systems of-
ten use separate “business rules” functionality to integrate such items into
the personalized recommendations generated through conventional means.
Adding the retailer as a stakeholder allows such considerations to be inte-
grated throughout the recommendation process.
We believe that, far from being special “edge cases”, these examples
illustrate a more general point about recommendation, namely, that rec-
ommender systems serve multiple goals and that the purely user-centered
approach found in most academic research does not allow all such goals to
enter into their design and evaluation. What is needed is a shift in focus, a
step back from a strict attention to the user to include the perspectives and
utilities of multiple stakeholders.
In microeconomics, a similar shift occurred in the early part of the 21st
century with the development of the theory of multisided platforms [118,
42]. Prior to that time, the traditional business model focused on a firm’s
ability to produce products and deliver them to customers at a price that
could ensure profitability. This model was inadequate to explain Internet
businesses such as search engines, that were giving their products away.
Once multisided platform theory was developed, it enabled economists to
look back at types of businesses that had existed for many years, such as
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credit card companies, shopping malls and stock exchanges, and recognize
them as examples of multisided platforms as well [43].
As noted above, when it comes to the study of personalized information
access in the form of recommender systems, academic research has, with few
exceptions, examined only a single side of these interactions. The stage was
set historically by the first recommender systems implementations, which
either operated on objects with no associated price (newsgroup posts [89])
or were external to any commerce associated with their recommendations
(such as music, movie, and restaurant recommenders [124, 17, 21].) These
systems brought users and products together, but they were not themselves
party to any transactions. While academic research has largely concentrated
on the user, commercial systems have regularly taken a broader view of
recommendation objectives [120, 104]. There is, therefore, a gap between
the complexity of real-world applications of recommender systems and those
on which academic research has focused.
The integration of the perspectives of multiple parties into recommen-
dation generation and evaluation is the goal underlying the new sub-field
of multistakeholder recommendation [2, 24, 104]. This article is intended to
describe the current state of the art in multistakeholder recommendation
research, to show some examples of current work in the area, and to out-
line research questions that should be addressed to support the demands
of recommendation applications in environments where the perspectives of
multiple parties are important.
2 Multistakeholder Recommendation
One important finding in the economics of multisided platforms is that dif-
ferent applications require different distributions of benefits or metrics of
utility. In many multisided platforms, there is a “subsidy side” of the trans-
action where one set of parties uses the platform at a reduced cost or no
cost. For example, users of the OpenTable restaurant reservation service do
not pay to make reservations; instead, restaurants pay for each reservation
made [43]. Thus, Rochet and Tirole define a two-sided platform as one where
the platform the volume of transactions varies with the consumer-side price,
but not with the aggregate transaction price. If OpenTable customers are
charged for their reservations, there will be fewer transactions, even if the
platform lowers what it charges to restaurants. By contrast, a VAT tax can
be divided up among the buyer and seller in different ways, and we expect
this to have no effect on the market [119].
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The provision of recommendations does not necessarily entail a mone-
tary transaction, but it is still worth considering users’ interactions with a
recommender system as a transaction. The user engages in some activity,
for example visiting an e-commerce site, and recommendations are provided
as a consequence of that interaction. Research has shown that consumers
value such recommendations, thus we can attribute an associated utility for
the user. Each transaction has the potential to impact others, such as man-
ufacturers trying to sell their products, authors trying to sell their books,
etc. A seller whose products are recommended in a given transaction will
get some value from it, which could be considered the expected value of a
recommendation turning into a sale or other similar benefit. There may not
be a monetary cost, on any side, to using a recommender system, but in-
stead there may be other kinds of costs: time investment, opportunity costs
relative to other platforms, etc.
2.1 Definitions
A recommender system can be abstractly defined in the following way. Let
U be a collection of users and their associated data. Let I be a collection
of items plus data, and let R be a collection of data about the interactions
between users and items, such as ratings, clicks, or purchases, with individual
entries denoted as rui. We define a recommender system S as a function f
that maps from a user, an item, and the interaction data to a score that will
be used to rank items for recommendation to the user.
S : f(u, i, R)− > IR (1)
We distinguish between a user-oriented recommender system and a mul-
tistakeholder recommender system by how we understand the output of this
function. In a user-oriented recommender system, we interpret the output
of the recommendation function as representing a prediction of the user’s
preference for the item. In other words, it will be comparable in some sense
to the input interactions. Thus, among other properties, we expect a user-
oriented recommendation function to be a type of mapping that preserves
ordering properties of the input:
∀i, j ∈ I : if rui ≥ ruj → f(u, i, R) ≥ f(u, j, R) (2)
This will not generally be true in a multistakeholder context. For ex-
ample, a system might promote certain items in the interest of fairness
towards item providers. In such a system, we do not interpret the output as
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strictly reflecting the user’s preferences, and the condition of Equation 2 is
not expected to hold. Instead, we interpret f merely as a scoring function
implemented for the purposes of ranking. We analyze such a scoring func-
tion by examining how it combines the preferences of different stakeholders
of which the user is one.
Of course, as a practical matter, any recommender system is imple-
mented by a single organization and so, trivially, would be intended to (only)
represent its interests. However, when we analyze multistakeholder recom-
mendation here, we are interested in developing a deeper understanding of
how an organization might consider the perspectives of different parties – the
stakeholders – in designing a recommender system. A multistakeholder rec-
ommender system is, therefore, one in which the ranking function cannot be
understood as extrapolating from users’ preferences to new items. Rather,
the ranking function is best understood as representing the interests of mul-
tiple parties. In this paper, we are considering ranking functions that are
designed to balance specific stakeholder needs, as opposed to market-based
mechanisms that achieve such balance through economic means.
Although some applications might require a larger set, in this paper, we
consider the following stakeholders:
Consumers C : The consumers are those who receive the recommenda-
tions. They are the individuals whose choice or search problems bring
them to the platform, and who expect recommendations to satisfy
those needs.
Providers P : The providers are those entities that supply or otherwise
stand behind the recommended objects, and possibly gain utility from
the consumer’s choice.
System S : The final category is the platform itself, which has created the
recommender system in order to match consumers with providers and
has some means of gaining benefit from successfully doing so. The
platform may be a retailer, e-commerce site, broker, or other venue
where consumers seek recommendations.
2.2 Classes of multistakeholder applications
With these distinctions in mind, we can classify recommender systems based
on how they support and incorporate the preferences of different stakehold-
ers. See Figure 1 for a summary of the notation that we will use in this
discussion. We represent each type of stakeholder (C, P, S) by an element in
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this triplet, and the requirements related to that stakeholder with associated
subscripts and superscripts.
A system may support passive or active interaction (or both). A passive
system provides recommendations unprompted by the user, such as “Rec-
ommended for you” items that are listed on many sites. We will use a
superscript minus sign, as in C−, to indicate the passive case. Active sys-
tems provide recommended items in response to some type of query or overt
request from the user, denoted by the superscript plus sign: C+. We extend
this notion of active vs. passive to providers.
Figure 1: Stakeholder configuration notation.
Another distinction has to do with the type of personalization an applica-
tion supports. We can characterize personalization in terms of stakeholder
preferences. If the system does not attempt to provide items that match
stakeholder preferences, we say that the system is neutral, and use the sub-
script n. For example, an e-commerce site may not consider the provider
when delivering recommendations.
Typically, the system will attempt to satisfy the needs of at least one
type of stakeholder by offering recommendations tailored (at least in part) to
their preferences. This condition is denoted with the subscript p. When the
stakeholder is the consumer, this is the most common personalized recom-
mendation scenario. When there is personalization for both the consumer
and the provider, we have reciprocal recommendation.
Table 1 shows a taxonomy of possible stakeholder configurations when
considering consumer and provider stakeholders only. We have dropped the
Cn configurations from this analysis as a system that is not personalized
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to end users does not generally qualify as a recommender system. Thus,
the row contains only the passive vs active distinction. For providers, there
is the additional possibility of neutral vs personalized, and therefore four
columns.
Passive Active
P−n P−p P+n P+p
Passive C−p Standard
recom-
menda-
tion
Reciprocal
recom-
menda-
tion
Paid
placement
Display
advertis-
ing
Active C+p Personalized
search
Reciprocal
person
search
Search ad-
vertising
Reciprocal
person
search
Table 1: 〈C,P, Sn〉 multistakeholder designs
We can survey this space starting with the first row and column. This
is the standard e-commerce recommendation scenario in which there is no
attention paid to the provider side of the interaction. If the user formulates
a query or other prompt to the system, we have a type of recommendation
that personalizes search results, as is more and more common in search
engines.
If the system is not neutral with respect to the provider, it must try to
match consumers to provider preferences. Such designs are less common in
research although perhaps not in practice. In the passive case (column 2),
provider preferences are gathered implicitly through provider actions, for
example, the acceptance of requests made by recommendation consumers
– such as an AirBnB host deciding whether or not to accept a guest. A
system can learn provider preferences from such actions in the same way
that it learns about the preferences of consumers, leading to the type of
reciprocal recommendation designs discussed above.
In the active case, the provider can specify the type of consumer that is a
desirable target. The neutral case (column 3) is one where the system does
not attempt to personalize by learning differences between providers; it just
matches users against providers’ audience requirements. “Promoted posts”
within social media sites are a good example – these are recommendations
given to users for whom they are a good fit, but only if the provider has
indicated a specific interest in those consumers.
Where users are actively posing a query, we see familiar scenarios from
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search engine advertising. The placement of such ads takes place through
a bidding process in which the providers’ bids and the click likelihood are
scored [39]. To the extent that click likelihood is calculated on a per-user
basis, such systems could fall into either of the consumer active categories
(C+∗ ).
A case that is arguably personalized with respect to the provider’s utility
is found in online display advertising. Here there is a form of reciprocation
in that the ad should be appealing to the user and the user should be in the
defined target audience. Real-time auctions are used in which providers are
expected to quantify the utility they expect from a given ad placement [143]
and therefore the results for different providers can be different. Person-
to-person search as in online dating sites also may incorporate reciprocal
considerations. See Section 5.1 below.
2.3 System stakeholder
Table 1 only looks at cases where the design is neutral with respect to
the recommendations it produces, not gaining or losing utility based on
what results are produced. This is the classical model of how recommender
systems operate. However, in many real-world contexts, the system may
gain some utility when recommending items. When the system is included
as a stakeholder, there is a third dimension to the taxonomy.
Where the system does benefit from recommendation delivery, it may
be in the form of a simple aggregate of the other stakeholders’ utilities. For
example, in many e-commerce settings, the system will get a commission
for each sale, and such benefits can be considered together with personaliza-
tion [104]. Consistent with our notation, we will denote this case with the
notation Sa (aggregate) and the neutral case with Sn (neutral).
Alternatively, the system may seek to tailor outcomes specifically to
achieve particular objectives. For example, an educational site may view the
recommendation of learning activities as a curricular decision and seek to
have its recommendations fit a model of student growth and development.
Its utility may, therefore, be more complex than a simple aggregation of
those of the other stakeholders. This possibility of recommendations targeted
to system goals is designated with St.
This survey leaves us with a nuanced picture of the multistakeholder
recommendation space, a three-dimensional extension of Table 1 shown in
Figure 2. Each cell in this space can be defined by a triple 〈C,P, S〉, in which
the type of interaction available to each stakeholder is specified. We have
designs in which users are active or passive, that provide neutral and person-
8
Figure 2: Multistakeholder design landscape
alized results to providers, and allow for passive or active recommendation
interactions, while the third dimension covers the different possibilities for
system stakeholder. We will use the 〈C,P, S〉 triple notation throughout the
discussion below to identify the area of the design space each application or
area of research addresses. Many of these possibilities, especially the St
designs, have been rarely explored in the research literature.
3 State of Current Research
Multistakeholder recommendation brings together research in a number of
areas within the recommender systems community and beyond: (1) in eco-
nomics, the areas of multisided platforms and fair division; (2) the grow-
ing interest in multiple objectives for recommender systems, including such
concerns as fairness, diversity, and novelty; and, (3) the application of per-
sonalization to matching problems.
3.1 Economic foundations
The study of the multisided business model was crystallized in the work of
Rochet and Tirole [118]on what they termed “two-sided markets.” Economists
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now recognize that such contexts are often multisided, rather than two-sided,
and that “multisided-ness” is a property of particular business platforms,
rather than a market as a whole [43]. Prior to their work, the traditional
business model focused on a firm’s ability to produce products and deliver
them to customers at a price that would ensure profitability. This model
was inadequate to explain Internet businesses such as search engines that
were giving their products away.
Multisided platforms bring together market participants, and create value
by lowering their transaction and search costs [42, 43]. Many of today’s
recommender systems are embedded in multisided platforms and hence re-
quire a multisided approach. The business models of multisided platforms
are quite diverse, which means it is difficult to generalize about multistake-
holder recommendation as well. A key element of the success of a multisided
platform is the ability to attract and retain participants from all sides of the
business, and so developers of such platforms must model and evaluate the
utility of the system for all stakeholders.
The theory of just division of resources has a long intellectual tradition
going back to Aristotle’s well-known dictum that “Equals should be treated
equally.” Economists have invested significant effort into understanding and
operationalizing this concept and other related ideas. See [103] for a sur-
vey. In recommendation and personalization, we find ourselves on the other
side of Aristotle’s formulation: all users are assumed unequal and unequal
treatment is the goal, but we expect this treatment to be consistent with
diverse individual preferences. Some aspects of this problem have been stud-
ied under the subject of social choice theory [13]. However, there is not a
straightforward adaptation of these classical economic ideas to recommen-
dation applications as the preferences of users may interact only indirectly
and in subtle ways. For example, if a music player recommends a hit song
to user A, this will not in any way impact its desirability or availability to
user B. On the other hand, if the job recommender system recommends an
appealing job to user A, it may well have an impact on the utility of the
same recommendation to user B who could potentially face an increased
competitive environment if she seeks the same position.
3.2 Multi-objective recommendation
Multistakeholder recommendation is an extension of recent efforts to ex-
pand the considerations involved in recommender system evaluation beyond
simple measurements of accuracy. There is a large body of recent work on
incorporating diversity, novelty, long tail promotion and other metrics as
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additional objectives for recommendation generation and evaluation. See,
for example, [1, 126, 146, 133, 69]. There is also a growing body of work on
combining multiple objectives using constraint optimization techniques, in-
cluding linear programming. See, for example, [68, 6, 128, 121, 73, 7]. These
techniques provide a way to limit the expected loss on one metric (typically
accuracy) while optimizing for another, such as diversity. The complexity
of these approaches increases exponentially as more constraints are consid-
ered, making them a poor fit for the general multistakeholder case. Also,
for the most part, multi-objective recommendation research concentrates on
maximizing multiple objectives for a single stakeholder, the end user.
Another area of recommendation that explicitly takes a multi-objective
perspective is the area of health and lifestyle recommendation. Multiple
objectives arise in this area because users’ short-term preferences and their
long-term well-being may be in conflict [96, 115]. In such systems, it is
important not to recommend items that are too distant from the user’s
preferences – even if they would maximize health. The goal to be persuasive
requires that the user’s immediate context and preferences be honored.
Fairness is an example of a system consideration that lies outside the
strict optimization of an individual user’s personalized results. Therefore,
recent research efforts on fairness in recommendation are also relevant to
this work [94, 25, 22, 84, 82, 141]. The multistakeholder framework provides
a natural “home” for such system-level considerations, which are otherwise
difficult to integrate into recommendation. See Section 7 for a more in-depth
discussion.
3.3 Personalization for matching
The concept of multiple stakeholders in recommender systems is suggested
in a number of prior research works that combine personalization and match-
ing. The earliest work on two-sided matching problems [122] assumes two
sets of individuals, each of which has a preference ordering over possible
matches with the other set. The task to make a stable assignment has been
shown to have an O(n2) solution. This formulation has some similarities
to reciprocal recommendation. However, it assumes that all assignments
are made at the same time, and that all matchings are exclusive. These
conditions are rarely met in recommendation contexts, although extensions
to this problem formulation have been developed that relax some of these
assumptions in online advertising contexts [15].
Researchers on reciprocal recommendation have looked at bi-lateral con-
siderations to ensure that a recommendation is acceptable to both parties
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in the transaction [113]. See Section 5.1 for a detailed discussion. A clas-
sical example is on-line dating in which both parties must be interested in
order for a match to be successful [137]. Other reciprocal recommendation
domains include job seeking [121], peer-to-peer “sharing economy” recom-
mendation (such as AirBnB, Uber and others), on-line advertising [65], and
scientific collaboration [99, 130].
The field of computational advertising has given considerable attention
to balancing personalization with multistakeholder concerns. Auctions, a
well-established technique for balancing the concerns of multiple agents in
a competitive environment, are widely used both for search and display
advertising [143, 101]. However, the real-time nature of these applications
and the huge potential user base makes recommender-style personalization
computationally impractical.
4 Examples
In the following sections, we introduce three applications of multistakeholder
recommendation. These examples show some of the variety of contexts in
which this concept can be applied.
Section 5 looks what is perhaps the earliest application area for mul-
tistakeholder recommendation – reciprocal recommendation. In reciprocal
recommendation, the recommender system matches users with other users,
thus collapsing the distinction between consumers and providers: the con-
sumers of recommendations are also the individuals who might be recom-
mended to others. Depending on the application, reciprocal recommenda-
tion designs occupy the section of taxonomy represented by 〈C∗p , P ∗p , Sn〉,
where any combination of active or passive interaction on the part of users
might be part of the design.
Section 6 examines the broad class of 〈C∗p , P ∗∗ , Sa,t〉 designs where the
system’s interest is enhancing profit or economic value related to recom-
mendations that are produced. It looks specifically at a real-world example
of a commission-based system where recommendations can serve as unpaid
advertising to the provider. In this case, the economic viability of the rec-
ommendation platform depends on the ability to prioritize items that are
likely to generate commissions.
The final example in Section 7 examines the problem of fairness in recom-
mendation. Fairness is inherently a multistakeholder concept. If the only
consideration in recommendation generation is matching individual user’s
known preferences, then the question of whether recommendations are fair
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does not arise. Fairness is therefore a quintessential St system-level concern,
not reducible to the problem of maximizing aggregate utility for either con-
sumers or providers. Most fairness research takes the form of 〈C−p , P−n , St〉,
a variant of the standard consumer-oriented recommendation scenario, but
one where fairness of one type or another is important.
5 Example: People Recommendation
People recommendation is based on the notion of social matching [131], as
discussed above. The fact that the recommended entity is a person yields ad-
ditional reciprocity and requires additional considerations of trust, privacy,
reputation, and personal attraction. The symmetry between the individuals
means that these recommenders will have always both Cp and Pp aspects.
They may also have different types of system objectives as discussed below.
5.1 Reciprocal Recommenders
A reciprocal recommender as defined in [114] is a people-to-people recom-
mender system in which the preferences of both sides of the recommendation
should be taken into account (the user receiving the recommendation and
the user being recommended). Online dating recommenders as well as em-
ployment matching (talent recommenders and job recommenders) are prime
examples of reciprocal recommenders, given that no successful match or
recommendation of a date or job placement will occur without both par-
ties agreeing to it. Reciprocal recommenders differ from traditional non-
reciprocal recommenders in a number of ways. Table 2 shows some of these
main differences as described in the study done in [114].
As the table indicates, user behaviour is highly dependent on whether a
domain is reciprocal or not. The success of a traditional book recommender
is dependent only on the person receiving the recommendation. On the
other hand, in a reciprocal domain such as online dating, the user receiving
the recommendation knows that the contact suggested by the recommender
is only going to be successful if the other user also agrees to the contact.
The users of reciprocal domains can act either proactively by taking the
initiative to connect with other users or simply being reactive and waiting
for contact, in effect choosing either the consumer or provider role.
The “free-rider” problem is well-known in the recommender systems and
other online rating systems that depend on explicit user profiles. Users may
benefit from others’ contribution without adding their own and may lack an
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Table 2: Main differences between traditional recommenders and reciprocal
recommenders
Traditional Recom-
menders
Reciprocal Recommender
Success is determined solely
by the user seeking the recom-
mendation
Success is determined by both
subject and object of the rec-
ommendation
Users have no reason to pro-
vide detailed explicit user pro-
files.
Users expect to provide de-
tailed self-profiles. Explicit
profiles and preferences are of-
ten inaccurate.
Satisfied users are likely to re-
turn for more recommenda-
tions. Better recommenda-
tions means more engagement;
Users may leave the system af-
ter a successful recommenda-
tion; Better recommendations
might mean less engagement;
Items can get recommended
even when stocks are low; In-
formation items are always
available;
It is important not to over-
whelm users by recommending
popular users to others too of-
ten;
incentive to build up their profiles. In contrast, for reciprocal recommen-
dation, profiles have a communicative role in providing reasons to propose
or accept a contact, a clear need and benefit to provide rich user profiles.1
Conversely, however, user profile data consisting of interactions with items
may be sparser than in traditional recommendation contexts. In settings
such as online dating and job recommendation, the task is often to find a
suitable match quickly and exit the market. Users may only require a few in-
teractions to achieve this goal, as opposed to consumption-oriented contexts
where a user might rate dozens of books or hundreds of music tracks.
Because a successful recommendation in a reciprocal domain means that
the user is likely to leave the system, conflicting incentives are created for
platform owners. They want to have a profitable business by having re-
peated users, even though the best user experience would be for each user
to instantly find a match (a successful date/partner) and never return.
Another consideration important in reciprocal recommendation is that,
unlike other recommendation settings, the system’s utility is not necessarily
1For this reason, however, profiles are sometimes inaccurate [107], something that
reciprocal recommenders need to account for.
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increasing function of the volume of recommendations. For instance, imag-
ine if a highly qualified person is recommended to every single job position
that they are fit to hold. This person is likely to be burdened by the amount
of contact and might leave the website. A similar situation can occur for
popular users in a dating website. These users are important as they repre-
sent the best of each of these services, but they can easily be overwhelmed
by the interest of other users. Such a user should only be recommended to
others when the recommender is highly confident that they will reciprocate.
Many systems where people are in both sides of the recommendation
process benefit from reciprocity even when reciprocity is not required in the
system. In some of these domains such as Twitter, relationships have shown
to be stronger, with a lower likelihood on one breaking a social link, when
both users follow each other [139, 92, 88]. See Section 5.2.3 below.
5.1.1 Online Dating Recommendation
Reciprocal recommenders perfectly fit the problem of job recommenders and
online dating recommenders since these platforms define success in reciprocal
terms (i.e. if one side of the recommendation disagrees with a match then
the recommendation is not successful). That is not to say that these systems
(and their recommender systems) cannot exploit unbalanced market forces
that would make harder to satisfy a user with a large demand and small
supply (e.g. a highly skilled job seeker in a highly-demanded profession).
Online dating websites focus on recommending people that one might like
to date. Some websites also focus on friendships, therefore recommending
people one does not know yet. Dating websites could be built on existing
relationships and many have tried using existing social networks for this.
However, one of the reasons people go to dating websites because their
existing social connections do not provide them with the people with whom
they are interested in connecting romantically.
RECON [112] was the first recommender system to exploit the benefits
of reciprocity in the online dating context. This system works by calculating
a compatibility score between users and recommending people to people who
have higher reciprocal compatibility scores. A number of studies followed
this, including designs that focus on improving the cold-start problem of
reciprocal recommenders [9, 142].
Building on this work, Li and Li [95] proposed MEET, a generalised
reciprocal framework in order to integrate a number of aspects related to
the reciprocal domain and in particular in online dating. MEET uses a
bipartite graph that represent the mutual interest among a set of users to
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another set of users (men and women, in a heterosexual dating network). By
creating subgraphs, it is able to perform graph inference and obtain a list of
recommendations that is ranked based on mutual interests and filtered for
users who exceed a certain availability budget.
Xia et al. [138] proposed and compared a number of online dating recom-
menders including reciprocal content-based, memory-based and model-based
collaborative filtering and found that memory-based methods outperform
model-based models for female users who tend to have the largest sparsity
in their interaction matrix.
Goswami et al. [50] discusses reciprocal recommenders in more gen-
eral terms as a two-sided market and proposes a two-layer architecture for
recommendation ranking that looks at the preferences of both sides of the
market. Alanazi and Bain [11] developed a reciprocal recommender using
hidden Markov models.
5.2 People Recommendation on Social Media
At the core of social media are individual relationships which serve as a
fertile ground for recommendation. The underlying social network of a so-
cial media website – explicit through articulated connection or implicit via
shared interests or goals – drives diffusion and engagement as well as key
features such as news feeds and photo streams. The network’s size is often
considered a key metric of a social site’s success. Recommendations of peo-
ple on social media sites therefore play a key role in their success and have
become ubiquitous [53].
Three primary techniques are used for people recommendation on social
media:
• Graph-based techniques that consider the graph representation of the
network and apply link prediction algorithms, such as shortest paths,
PageRank, and clustering, on top of it. The edges of the graph may
carry different semantics according to the specific site and its under-
lying network.
• Interaction-based techniques that consider different types of user in-
teraction with content, which are widespread and diverse on social
media. These include bookmarking, commenting, tagging, sharing,
‘liking’, joining, and more.
• Content-based techniques that use the actual content, typically tying
it to its authors. Different text and image processing techniques, such
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as language modeling, syntactic parsing, word embedding, and object
detection are applied.
The literature on people recommendation has seen a substantial growth
in recent years. Recommendation types can be grouped based on the type
of relationship and its intended duration. Specifically, three types of rela-
tionships – familiarity, similarity, and interest – differentiate between the
different networks. Recommendations also differ on whether the action sug-
gested results in a permanent or temporary / ad-hoc relationship. In the
rest of this section, we will discuss the common aspects and differences be-
tween all six types of recommendations, according to their relationship type
and its intended action.
5.2.1 Recommending Familiar People
The most fundamental scenario of people recommendation on social media
suggests familiar people for a long-term (permanent) connection, namely the
recommendation of people to connect with on social network sites (SNSs),
whose primary type of connection is symmetric (confirmed), such as Face-
book and LinkedIn. This type of recommendation benefits both sides and
reciprocity is its main characteristic. As a result, the person who receives the
recommendation knows the other party (the recommended person) would
have to confirm the connection and this party’s anticipated reaction plays
a key role in the decision making process leading to accepting or ignoring
the recommendation. The permanent type of the connection also entails
high weight – accepting such a recommendation may lead to a multi-year
connection with another person on the SNS, which would involve receiving
updates, news, photos, posts, and other types of information over a long
period of time.
Widgets that proposed “people you may know” started to appear on
leading SNSs at the end of the previous decade. Early work conducted on
symmetric social networks within the enterprise, showed the benefit of ag-
gregating multiple signals for recommendation [32] and indicated a dramatic
effect on the number of connections on the site [54]. It was also shown that
providing evidence for a person’s recommendation, such as the joint docu-
ments they have with the individual who receives the recommendation, helps
making the latter feel more conformable accepting the recommendation and
triggering the invitation to connect.
Two interesting followup studies were conducted by Guy et al. (2009),
inspecting longer term effects. In the first, people recommendation were
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shown to increase engagement and retention rates on enterprise SNS when
new users were introduced with people recommendations [47]. In this sce-
nario, it was shown that the most effective recommendation ranking was by
activity on the site rather than by the total weight of connection signals to
the target user. Apparently, recommending active people has a special im-
pact when trying to engage new users. The second followup study focused
on the network effects of the provided recommendations [36]. It was shown
that different people recommendation algorithms render different network
structures, as reflected in a variety of social network analysis metrics, such as
betweenness centrality. Incorporating a global criterion into the recommen-
dation strategy moves this type of recommendation from the Sa category,
where the system is only interested in increasing the number of connections
made, to the St category, where the system is aiming to optimize a target
criterion independent of individual outcomes. As noted in Section 2, these
types of designs have not received much attention in the literature.
The ad-hoc scenario of familiar people recommendation is especially com-
mon on mobile devices, which provide location awareness and other types
of contextual properties. Henceforth, recommending two people who are al-
ready familiar with each other, in a specific context, such as when shopping
in the same mall or when going to same concert, becomes a handy use case.
Yet, privacy considerations must be respected, since this type of recommen-
dation requires exposure of one’s location to others. A different example of
the ad-hoc scenario for familiar people is demonstrated by Cluestr, which
suggested contacts that can be addressed as a group, such as co-workers,
family members, or friends, to support communication in a closed group
and save time in the group initiation process [51].
5.2.2 Recommending Similar People
The second relationship type involves similar individuals, where naturally
the number of potential candidates is the largest. Similarity signals are
abundant on social media, due to the rich types of content and user as-
sociations with it [57], and generally map to similarity in places, things,
and people [55]. Such signals can also be used to match-make strangers in
the enterprise [56]. This example of a permanent recommendation task is
considered an exploratory recommendation use case, where the hit rate is
expected to be lower than other types of recommendations, since the tar-
gets are unfamiliar. Yet, the value for a successful recommendation is much
higher: getting to know a new individual who has similar interests and with
whom a long-term relationship may be built will increase one’s social capi-
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tal. A stranger recommender will need to subtract familiarity signals from
the similarity signals to detect distant co-workers who may share common
interests with the target employee. Among other scenarios for permanent
recommendation of similar people are the dating and employee/employer
recommendations described in Section 5.1, when applied in the context of
social media websites.
The scenarios for ad-hoc recommendation of similar people are plenti-
ful. A prominent example is the recommendation of similar people at a
conference. Many resources are invested in organizing and traveling to the
conference, where networking and meeting new individuals is one of the key
goals. For example, in the academic research domain, such meetings can
assist in receiving help or advice with ongoing projects, acquiring new op-
portunities, finding potential partners, and discovering research directions.
Having said that, such meetings typically occur on a rather arbitrary basis.
Find & Connect [35] used physical proximity via RFID badges to recom-
mend new contacts at a conference, while SPARP [136] combined weak ties
with similar personal traits to generate recommendations. Both systems
were used and evaluated at real venues.
Two additional scenarios are the suggestion of guests for invitation to
an event and the recommendation of activity partners. For the first, both
relevance of the event to the guest and geographical proximity were consid-
ered and evaluation was performed using Foursquare data in London [123].
Activity partner recommendation was suggested as an accompanying sce-
nario to item recommendation, such as for a movie or a dinner [132]. The
recommendation algorithm considered the user’s similarity of interests to
the target as well as their probability to like the item itself. Evaluation
indicated that this kind of partner recommendation can improve the success
of item recommendation.
5.2.3 Recommending Interesting People
Interest plays a key role in the user-item space for typical item recommen-
dation, yet it also occurs as a relationship type between two users [66].
This relationship type is often associated with a “follow” recommendation
in asymmetric networks, where a user can connect to another party without
their need to approve or reciprocate [52]. With reciprocity removed, this
type of recommendation more closely resembles the standard 〈C−p , P−n , Sn〉
single stakeholder scenario.
For ad-hoc recommendation of interesting people, a salient scenario that
received substantial attention in recent years is the recommendation of peo-
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ple to mention on a tweet or other types of posts. For tweets, which are
limited in text length, the selection of individuals to mention is also limited
and associated with a concrete cost. On the other hand, mentions play a key
role in information dissemination, as mentioned individuals often re-post to
their own audience, thus entailing a potential reciprocal relation. From a
marketing perspective, the recommendation should take into account special
types of signals in addition to the relationship of the two users, such as the
content relevance and the response likelihood. In addition, the recommended
user’s popularity and influence can also play a role [134, 67]. As a result,
typical solutions combine graph-based, interaction-based, and content-based
methods to produce the ultimate list of recommendations [134, 49, 64].
5.3 Summary
The examples of people recommendation we provided in this section show
that a traditional user-oriented recommender system 〈C−p , P−n , Sn〉 might
not deliver the best recommendations for those scenarios. Problems like
reciprocal recommendation requiring P−p or P+p designs, where the needs
and interests of both parties (the person who is being recommended and the
person who receives the recommendation) can be taken into account. More-
over, in some reciprocal recommendation applications like online dating, the
recommender system may also need to attend to the differences in desirabil-
ity level of different users and try not to overwhelm certain users while not
giving enough exposure to others. Thus, the distribution of recommenda-
tions becomes important. In addition, in some situations, the system might
also have goals regarding the overall structure of the network constructed by
connecting people with each other. For example, websites like Twitter, may
want their network of users have certain properties (betweenness degree,
centrality etc.) and would therefore, need a 〈C∗p , P ∗n , St〉 design to deliver
recommendations targeted towards their desired network structure.
6 Example: Value-aware Recommendation
The literature in the field of recommender systems, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 1, mainly focuses on the consumer perspective with the system being
neutral regarding what items get recommended: the common 〈C−p , P−n , Sn〉
design. The goal of most research efforts is therefore to design algorithms
and systems that aim to provide value for the consumer in some form, e.g.,
by avoiding information overload or helping the consumer to discover new
items. Even then, in many cases, researchers tend to abstract away from
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real-world consumer value metrics, such as consumer surplus or satisfaction,
and focus on optimizing more general algorithmic metrics such as RMSE,
NDCG, or precision and recall.
The underlying implicit assumption here is that recommending only as-
sumedly relevant items to the user will also have a positive impact on the
value for the provider or the platform. In fact, a number of studies support
this hypothesis and show that providing personalized recommendations that
are optimized to match the user’s preferences lead to increased business
value, e.g., in terms of increased sales or click-through rates [48, 87, 71];
and, vice-versa, that unexpected or irrelevant recommendations can lead to
a decreased quality perception and trust by consumers [31, 45].
6.1 The business value of recommender systems
Generally, there are different ways in which a recommender can create value
for a provider or a platform. Considering the system or platform stakeholder,
e.g., an online retailer or streaming media site, a recommendation service
on the site can serve multiple purposes. It can, for example, lead to more
overall sales as mentioned above, it can more indirectly lead to increased
consumer engagement and loyalty, and it can even be a competitive factor
when other actors on the market do not have a recommendation service
[69]. Thus, a system might treat the utility of the recommender system as
being a purely aggregate function of the utility delivered to end users: the
Sa condition.
While factors like increased consumer engagement often considered to
lead to indirect business value, e.g., in terms of an increased number of
monthly re-subscriptions, recommendations can also be used to positively
impact the business in a more direct way. Specifically, recommenders can
be implemented as a tool that steers consumer demand, e.g., by promoting
certain items. The particular goal in that context can be to drive demand
in a direction that maximizes the platform’s short-term or long-term profit,
while also maintaining an acceptable level of consumer utility. A system of
this type would fall in the St category.
6.1.1 The need for a balanced approach
Simply recommending those items with the highest profit for the platform is
probably in almost all cases not the optimal strategy, at least not in the long
run, as consumers might start to distrust a recommendation service when
its suggestions are not considered useful. Generally, we can hypothesize that
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in many domains there is a trade-off between suggesting items that are the
most profitable for the platform and suggesting those that are considered
the most relevant for the user.
However, an additional intuitive assumption in that context might also
be that a recommender is still effective in steering consumer demand if the
order of the suggestions is not strictly determined by the assumed relevance
for the consumer, but also takes profitability considerations into account.
As an illustration for such a potential trade-off, let us consider the out-
comes of two simulation experiments shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 [70].
To conduct the simulations, artificial profitability data were added to the
items of the well-known MovieLens 1M dataset. Specifically, each movie in
the dataset was assigned a profitability value taken from a Gaussian distri-
bution, with a mean value of $2, a standard deivation of $1, and upper and
lower threshold values of $4 and $0, respectively.
In the first simulation experiment, we adopted the greedy item re-ranking
scheme from [5] to maximize the profit of the top-10 recommended items.
Technically, the method takes the relevance-optimized list of an underlying
recommendation algorithm, in our case a matrix factorization technique,
and pushes the items with the highest profit up the list, as long as their
predicted relevance surpasses some minimum threshold TR. Figure 3 shows
that without the consideration of the profit, in the case of providing top-N
item recommendations by explicitly considering only item relevance (i.e.,
“Baseline” in Figure 3), the average profit per user is slightly higher than
$2. However, when we take profitability information into account, even if we
restrict ourselves to recommending items for which the expected relevance
(rating) is higher than 4.5 (on a 1-to-5 scale), we can increase the profit
by more than 50% to over $3, with only a very limited loss on the overall
recommendation accuracy (as shown in terms of the F1 measure on the
Y-axis).
In this first simulation, the underlying assumption is that consumers
will always pick one of the recommended items. In some domains, however,
it might happen that in case the recommendations are unsuited – due to
limited relevance or generally poor quality – the consumer might decide not
to pick any of the recommendations at all, leading to a profit of 0. In the
second simulation we therefore introduced an exponential decay function
that models a decreasing purchase probability when the predicted relevance
is lower. The decay function was modeled in a way that we assumed a
10% probability that an item was purchased when it had a predicted rating
of 5, which leads to a high expectation of a purchase if all ten items in
the recommendation list have the highest possible rating. The decreasing
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Figure 3: Profit-relevance tradeoff (guaranteed purchase), from [70].
acceptance probability p of an item with a predicted rating r was then
modeled as follows.
p =
1
10
× eα∗(5−r) (3)
where α is a parameter that we set to -1.5 for this simulation.
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Figure 4: Profit optimization (relevance-based purchase), from [70].
When no re-ranking is done in this simulation the average profit per
user is at about 1.30. Figure 4 shows the effects of applying the profit-aware
re-ranking scheme. According to the simulation, the optimal threshold is at
about 4.5. When further lowering the threshold, even more profitable items
become available to be placed in the top-10 list. However, the higher profit
cannot compensate the rapidly decreasing purchase probabilities for such
items. When the threshold is set higher than 4.5, the problem exists that
there are not many (high-profit) items are left that can be moved up the
list. Nonetheless, the average profit per user is still higher than the baseline
profit of 1.30.
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The simulations in the two experiments are based on a comparably sim-
ple re-ranking scheme. In reality, more elaborate techniques can be applied
which in addition takes the price sensitivity of the individual user into ac-
count. In [75], for example, a corresponding generic optimization-based re-
ranking method is described, which is designed to balance multiple, possibly
conflicting optimization goals and to consider consumer-individual prefer-
ences regarding this balance.
6.2 Review of Selected Profit-Aware Approaches
In the literature, a variety of methodological approaches of different com-
plexities were explored to incorporate profit information into recommenders
and to balance relevance and profitability.
Considering not only the consumer preferences but also the profitability
for the seller, as discussed in the example above, was in the focus in [33]. In
this work, the authors compared different recommendation strategies that
combine general and customer-individual purchase probabilities of the items
with profitability information on synthetic data. Their simulations, like ours
above, indicate that higher overall profitability can be achieved without a
loss of accuracy for personalized recommendations. Focusing too much on
profitability, however, leads to an accuracy degradation.
Going beyond the comparably simple model of [33], Wang and Wu [135]
framed the selection of products for customers as a constrained optimization
problem. The constraints in the model ensure that the recommended prod-
ucts match the customer’s preferences and their assumed budgets. This work
therefore also considers the user’s price sensitivities. Different optimization
goals can be configured which either maximize the profit for the seller or lead
to a win-win situation where seller profits and customer value are balanced.
Alternative approaches that model the recommendation problem as a math-
ematical optimization task were later on put forward in [37, 10, 59, 14]. The
model proposed in [37], for example, includes the concept of trust, assuming
that a consumer will continue to make purchases as long as the system is
able to predict their preferences to a certain extent. The proposed work
unfortunately remained on a theoretical level and it is in particular unclear
to what extent the assumed trust model is realistic.
Lu et al. [100] take yet another set of factors into account in the revenue
model of their optimization-based approach, including prices, saturation ef-
fects and competition effects. A specific aspect of their work is that they
optimize the model over a finite time horizon, where the adoption probabil-
ity at each time step can depend on different factors such as the previous
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purchases by the consumer in the same class, the number of times a certain
item was already recommended, or the current price of the item and the in-
dividual consumer’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for it. Given the hardness of
the resulting optimization problem, the authors propose greedy optimization
strategies which they empirically evaluated on semi-synthetic data. Pricing
based on the predicted WTP is also considered in [76].
A quite different optimization problem is formulated in [59], where the
goal is to generate a set of recommendations that maximizes the probabil-
ity of a purchase. Therefore, instead of maximizing the revenue based on
individual-item profitability considerations, the main short-term goal is to
convert the visitor to a buyer. Challenging existing works that solely focus
on purchase probabilities, Bodapati [16] argues that one should also consider
how consumer’s would behave if no recommendations would be presented to
them. If a certain product will be purchased by a consumer anyway with a
certain probability, it might be better not to recommend it, given the limited
number of recommendations that can be made.
Generally, all works discussed so far were mostly evaluated based on some
form of simulations based either on synthetic or real-world data. The work
of Azaria et al. [14] is one of the few examples where the consumers’ quality
perception of and satisfaction with profit-optimized recommendation was
assessed in a user study. The participants, who were recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk, received different types of recommendations and were also
queried about their willingness to pay. The results of a real-world field
test on the effect of different recommendations, including a profit-oriented
one based on the model of [63], are reported by Panniello et al. [108]. In
their study, recommendations were provided to consumers through e-mail
newsletters. Both these studies found that a profit-sensitive strategy led
to an increased average revenue without a significant loss in terms of the
participants’ satisfaction.
The study by Panniello et al. is one of the few works that consider longer-
term effects of profit-aware recommendations. Most other works so far in
contrast focus on maximizing business value in the short term. Longer-term
effects were studied in particular by Hosanagar et al. [63] who concluded from
their theoretical analyses that optimal recommendations balance profit mar-
gins and item relevance. Furthermore, they emphasized on the importance
of considering the current reputation of the provider when implementing the
strategy.
The expected customer lifetime value (CLV) is a well-known instrument
from the management and marketing literature. Limited work however ex-
ists that tries to connect CLV-related activities like promotions, cross-buying
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or retention-pricing in combination with recommender systems. Recency,
frequency, and monetary (RFM) characteristics of consumers are usually
used as a basis for CLV estimates. One possible approach, as discussed in
[97, 125], is to group consumers into segments if their CLV estimates are
similar and to incorporate the consumer’s segment assignment in the rec-
ommendation process. To what extent the consideration of these aspects
has an impact on longer-term customer loyalty and the resulting CLV was
however not yet been the focus of experimental evaluation.
6.3 Implementing Value-Aware Recommendation
An interesting real-world context for value-aware multistakeholder occurs
in multisided platforms where the system earns a variable commission from
sales to different providers. For example, a travel web site may earn a com-
mission when a user uses its site to book a hotel room, and these commissions
may vary by property. The choice of which hotel rooms to recommend there-
fore involves a distribution of utility among all three stakeholders. In this
section, we discuss a solution developed for this complex scenario.
A direct approach would be to try to compute and optimize expected
conversion rate times expected profit per conversion, a classic economic ap-
proach to optimizing revenue. However, as outlined in [90] it will generally
not give the optimal solution in real world situations. One significant rea-
son is because specific conversion values for recommendations are difficult
to predict accurately, much more so than generating a ranked list of recom-
mendations. As such, the estimated conversion may introduce error into the
solution. In addition, the conversion component is likely to interact with
the profit per conversion term. Because of the complexity of optimizing the
equation, the solution is likely to be sub-optimal.
A second approach is to add a separate value-aware function and com-
bine it with the relevancy-based recommendations such that profit is used to
distinguish recommendations with similar relevancy. Conceptually, the de-
signer of the recommendation system can add their knowledge of consumer
behavior and profitability of supply to maintain relevancy while trying to
maximize profit. Business criteria such as budget restrictions, competitive
offerings, particulars on the profitability of different groups of items can
be factored into the value-aware function and how it is combined with the
relevancy rankings. The Kendall-tau metric can be used to optimize the
value-aware function by comparing the recommendations based only on rel-
evancy with those combining the value-aware function and minimizing the
difference. As this method is based on heuristics, it needs to be supported
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with simulations and live testing to ensure the value-aware recommendations
maintain a high level of relevancy.
For convenience in this case [90] found it to best decompose compensa-
tion to its base elements, i.e. to the percentage commission and product
cost. These could then be compared and recombined with the other com-
ponents of the recommendations. It was also found that balancing the price
component was a key element, since higher prices naturally decreased user
purchase conversion even while increasing profits.
6.3.1 Approach
The approach outlined here is to combine value-awareness into a ranking
objective directly as described in [104]. To do so, the formation of the rec-
ommendation list was defined as a multi-objective problem involving a linear
combination of the potentially-conflicting objectives of product relevancy,
price and the commission percentage earned by the recommender. This was
accomplished by defining a novel learning to re-rank optimization problem
built on the kernel version of the Kendall tau correlation metric [74].
The concept is essentially an extension of the second approach for value-
awareness inclusion, but instead of having a separate value function, Nguyen
developed his recommender algorithm to re-rank the initial set of relevancy
recommendations with a learning to rank algorithm, so the final ranking
was also optimized for the commission, while not deviating significantly
from the base ranking. He showed the effectiveness of this approach against
a business-rules based model that followed the second approach on a real-
world dataset of hotel recommendations from Expedia. It delivered the best
performance trade-off for the two objectives under consideration, conversion
and margin. This algorithm is detailed in the sections that follow.
6.3.2 Ranking with sales margin
Let X ∈ X denote the set of n items with some set of known relevance
labels y ∈ Y derived from user interaction Also let f : X × Y → R be the
recommender system used at the first stage to produce the vector of scores
u ∈ Rn that describe the product’s relevance or utility with respect to a
consumer search, that is:
u = {Pr(yi = 1|xi)}ni=1
= {f(xi, yi)}ni=1
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These relevance scores are sorted from high to low to deliver a rele-
vance ranking of product recommendations. We will use the notation r(ui)
to indicate the rank of item i in such a list by virtue of having the score
ui. To produce such scores, learning-to-rank recommender systems typically
follow a pairwise approach in which a ranking metric like the Normalized
Discount Cumulative Gain (NDCG) is optimized over pairs of items so that
relevant items are ranked in top positions [19, 18, 20]. In particular, Lamb-
daRank [19] is one of the most effective approaches [38] due to its ability to
minimize a surrogate loss Lr of the NDCG metric (equivalent to maximizing
this metric):
min
f
Lr(y|X) =
∑
yi≥yj
log(1 + exp(−θ(ui − uj)))|∆NDCGij | (4)
where ui = f(xi, yi) and ∆
NDCG
ij = (2
yi−2yj )(log(1+r(ui))− log(1+r(uj)))
is the cost in terms of NDCG of exchanging item i with item j from position
r(ui) to position r(uj).
The first step in adding value-awareness to f is to outline the commission
paid to the recommender as a portion of sales (margin, m), which is equal
to the selling price p of the product minus its cost c, i.e. m = p− c, and in
the expectation is equal to:
E[m|X ,Y] = E[Pr(Y = 1|X )×m]
= E[f(X ,Y)×m] (5)
To maximize its commission the recommender has then to solve the following
objective function L given by maximum log-likelihood of (5):
max
α,β
L(m|u) =
n∑
i=1
log(ui) + α log(pi) + β log(mi/pi) (6)
where α and β are tuning parameters (originally set to one) that gives the
importance of the log margin component which are separated into price and
margin percent; i.e. log(m) = log(m/p) + log(p).
As initially noted, there is the potential for interactions between these
factors and the recommendation task is a multi-objective optimization prob-
lem fitting the 〈C−p , P−n , St〉 description. The objectives include relevance as
defined by the score u, the supplier’s interest as defined by price p and the
intermediary’s percent commission m/p. The core problem is to solve for the
intrinsic relation between the factors, which are contradictory: consumers
want the lowest price, sellers want the highest price and lowest commission,
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and the platform wants the highest commission consistent with consumer
purchase). Note that this is not a simple aggregation Sa of supplier margins
because the commissions may differ among them.
The problem then becomes how to optimize the weight β of the recom-
mender with respect to the input attribute X, the relevance scores u and
the suppliers’ margins m, that is:
max
β
L(m|u,X) =
n∑
i=1
log(ui) + α log(pi) + β(xi,mi) log(mi/pi) (7)
where α was treated as a fixed hyper-parameter.
6.3.3 Learning to re-rank
The problem in Equation 7 was framed as a learning-to-re-rank problem
such that the new ranking order provided by this formula stays as close as
possible to the original ranking order u while maximizing the margins m.
This was done using the Kendall tau correlation metric, which operates on
the relative pairwise order of the items to produce a new ranking of items
which maximizes the margin while minimizing the distance between the new
and old rankings.
u′ ∈ Rn is the set of new scores derived from equation (7), i.e.
∀u ∈ u, u′ = u+ α log(p) + β(x,m) log(m/p)
From a ranking perspective, u′ is one permutation of u in the
(
n
2
)
= n(n−
1)/2 permutation space of n items, and to measure the distance between the
two score vectors in this space the Kendall tau correlation measure [86] can
be used. It counts the number nc of concordant pairs versus the number
nd of discordant pairs between the two vectors can be used. Thus we can
compute:
nc(u,u
′) =
∑
i<j
I(r(ui) > r(uj)) I(r(u′i) > r(u′j))
+ I(r(ui) < r(uj)) I(r(u′i) < r(u′j))
nd(u,u
′) =
∑
i<j
I(r(ui) > r(uj)) I(r(u′i) < r(u′j))
+ I(r(ui) < r(uj)) I(r(u′i) > r(u′j))
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The Kendall tau correlation measure can then be defined as:
K(u,u′) =
nc(u,u
′)− nd(u,u′)
n(n− 1)/2 (8)
which has been shown to be a positive-definite kernel [74].
With such a kernel, we can apply the kernel trick [62] to optimize
over this metric. More precisely, following [74], we define the mapping
function φ : Rn → Rn(n−1)/2, as well as its smooth version φ′, which is given
by transforming the indicator function I of the function φ to its sigmoid
counterpart σ(x) = 11+exp(−θx) :
φ(u) =
(
1√
n(n− 1)/2(I(r(ui) > r(uj))− I(r(ui) < r(uj)))
)
i<j
φ′(u) =
(
1√
n(n− 1)/2(σ(ui − uj)− σ(uj − ui))
)
i<j
from which the kernelized version of Kendall tau can be defined as:
Kˆ(u,u′) = φ(u)>φ′(u′) (9)
which makes use of the smooth φ′ on the new score u′ since learning will
occur on this side of the kernel.
The task is two-fold for the optimization problem: learn a new ranking
order u′ of the items, described by features X, which maximizes the NDCG
of commissions m. This can be expressed as a standard learning-to-rank
problem similar to equation (4), but defined here as Lr(m|X) and optimized
for the new scores u′. At the same time, the distance of the new ranking
u′ to the original ranking u is to be minimized, which can be written using
the Kendall tau metric K(u,u′). The full optimization problem can be then
written as:
min
β
L(m|u,X) = Lr(m|X) + γ(1− Kˆ(u,u′)) (10)
In problem (10), the kernelized Kendall tau metric Kˆ(u,u′) plays the
role of a similarity-based regularizer with the original ranking order u being
the reference point to the new ranking order u′. Also, the hyper-parameter
γ gives the balance between the two terms of the optimization; with a high
γ, the new ranking order u′ will not diverge too much from the original
one, but neither will the commission, while with a low γ items with a high
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Table 3: Relative Improvement of NDCG@10 on Expedia Hotel Searches
versus Relevance-only recommendations using Learning to Re-Rank
Clicks+Bookings Margin
Baseline -8.7% +16.7%
LRR -5.9% +16.7%
commission will be more likely to be pushed up, increasing the chance of
profit, unless the items have a low relevance.
Overall, the problem (10) is a reformulation of the multi-objective prob-
lem (7) in the learning-to-rank framework; it finds exactly the best weight
β that maximizes the commission with the constraint of maintaining the
importance of relevance u. Therefore by solving problem (10), (7) is also
solved.
6.3.4 Experimental Evaluation
The learning-to-re-rank (LRR) approach was evaluated on an Expedia dataset
built from world-wide hotel searches collected during 2016, where the under-
lining recommendation technique was matrix factorization [3]. The base-
line value-aware model was based on one developed using the second value-
awareness method and had been optimized through extensive A/B testing.
[91]. Both of these were compared to the relevance-only recommendations,
which had no value-awareness (based purely on ui),
The results are provided in Table 3. NDCG@10 on customer clicks +
bookings was used to measure the relevance of the recommendations and
the achieved commission % for the value-awareness. We see that both
value-aware approaches delivered similar performance for the commission,
+16.7%, but the learning to re-rank approach has a lower loss in relevance
, with a decrease of -5.9% versus -8.7% in NDCG.
6.4 Summary
Our brief review and example shows that there is a history of both applied
and theoretical work in recommender systems in which the roles and goals of
the different stakeholders are considered in developing of price- and profit-
aware recommender systems. The reviewed studies in general suggest that
profit-aware recommendation strategies can lead to a substantially higher
business values for the provider, at least in the short term, without a con-
siderable loss in recommendation quality and trust. The proposed models
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however differ in their complexity. While some studies are based on compa-
rably simple, static adoption probabilities, others consider more comprehen-
sive models with time-varying adoption probabilities and limited consumer
budgets. Furthermore, some works focus on promoting the most profitable
products through recommendations, others aim to maximize the profit by
trying to maximize the conversion rate or by stimulating purchases which
would not have happened without the recommender system. The example
application demonstrates a real-world context in which multiple stakeholder
considerations are relevant and can be combined successfully into a single
optimization model.
7 Example: Fairness-aware Recommendation
Fairness may be an important consideration when recommender systems are
deployed in settings where harmful discrimination may occur: for example,
in housing or employment. In general, we are concerned about fairness when
the system’s outcomes for one group may be worse than for another group,
especially if the groups are distinguished by a sensitive or protected feature.
As noted above, fairness is an important example where the system has a
distinct role as a stakeholder, the St case where the system has global objec-
tives that recommendations should meet. There are three classes of systems,
distinguished by the fairness issues that arise relative to these groups: con-
sumers (C-fairness), providers (P-fairness), and both (CP-fairness) [22].
C-fairness: A recommender system distinguished by C-fairness is one that
must take into account the disparate impact of recommendation on
protected classes of recommendation consumers. For example, in a
job recommender system that has a C-fairness requirement, the rec-
ommendations should be fair towards the users in the protected class
(as defined by gender, age, nationality, etc.) relative to other users.
P-fairness: A recommender system that has a P-fairness requirement should
treat the providers of the items in a fair way. For example, it could
mean that minority-owned businesses have their jobs recommended to
qualified candidates.
CP-fairness: Finally, if a recommender system needs to demonstrate fair-
ness towards both consumers and providers, then it has a CP-fairness
requirement. For example, a rental property recommender may have
both protected renters and protected landlords to consider.
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7.1 Applications for Fairness-Aware Recommendation
There are many applications in which a fairness-aware approach to rec-
ommendation might be required or desirable. Here we list three common
situations:
7.1.1 Adherence to Laws and Regulations
Recommendation services must be managed so as to adhere to applicable
laws and regulations. This type of applications would often require fair-
ness for a consumer stakeholder (C-fairness). We will consider the example
of a suspicious advertisement placement based on keyword-matching [129].
Users whose names are more popular among individuals of African descent
than European descent were more frequently shown advertisements imply-
ing arrest records. According to an investigation, however, no deliberate
manipulation was responsible; rather, the bias arose simply as a side-effect
of algorithms to optimize the click-through rate. Because similar algorithms
of Web content optimization are used for online recommendations, such as
for online news recommendations, similar discriminative recommendations
might appear in these contexts. For example, fairness-aware recommenda-
tion would be helpful for matching an employer and a job applicant based
not on gender or race, but on other factors, such as the applicant’s skill level
at the tasks required for the job.
7.1.2 Exclusion of Unwanted Information
Fairness-aware recommendation is also helpful for avoiding the use of infor-
mation that is restricted by law or regulation. For example, privacy policies
prohibit the use of certain types of information for the purpose of making
recommendations. In such cases, by treating the prohibited information as
a sensitive feature, the information can be successfully excluded from the
prediction process of recommendation outcomes.
Another C-fairness requirement may come from users who want recom-
menders to exclude the influence of specific information. Pariser introduced
the concept of the filter bubble problem, which is the concern that per-
sonalization technologies narrow and bias the topics of interest provided to
users of news and social media sites, who may not even notice this phe-
nomenon [109]. If a user of a social network service wishes to converse with
people having a wide variety of political opinions, a friend recommendation
that is not influenced by the friends’ political conviction will provide an
opportunity to meet people with a wide range of views.
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7.1.3 Fair Treatment of Content Providers
Fairness-aware recommendation can be used to ensure the fair treatment of
content providers or product suppliers (P-fairness). For example, the Federal
Trade Commission has been investigating Google to determine whether the
search engine ranks its own services higher than those of competitors [46].
The removal of deliberate manipulation is currently considered to ensure the
fair treatment of content providers. However, algorithms that can explicitly
exclude information whether or not content providers are competitors would
be helpful for dismissing the competitors’ doubts that their services may be
unfairly underrated.
7.2 Review of Recommender Fairness
Fairness in algorithmic systems admits of a variety of definitions and has
been the subject of considerable recent research. See [58] for a survey of
fairness in data mining applications. Fairness in recommender systems is a
subtly different problem where users are recognized as inherently different.
Researchers have examined different fairness conditions and criteria in a
range of different contexts.
One question is whether different groups receive different levels of ser-
vice quality from a recommendation algorithm. Ekstrand et al. examine
this phenomenon in the C-fairness context in [40] using movie and music
data sets, and in the P-fairness context using book recommendation [41].
These papers showed that recommendation algorithms differ in their de-
gree of output bias, and that these biases can appear on both sides of the
recommendation interaction.
A variety of algorithmic approaches for remedying unfairness in rec-
ommendation have been explored. An approach based on statistical in-
dependence is discussed below. Other approaches treat fairness as a kind
of diversity and use diversity-enhancing mechanisms, such as re-ranking to
achieve fairer results. In [98], a diversity-oriented re-ranking method is used
to improve P-fairness for loans in the Kiva crowdsourced microlending sys-
tem. In [127], P-fairness is enhanced by approximating the solution to a
constraint satisfaction problem. This work defines fairness relative to the
distribution of recommendation across different retailers in an e-commerce
platform, similar to the exposure distribution proposed in [102].
Other researchers have incorporated fairness objectives into recommen-
dation algorithms, usually in the context of P-fairness. In addition to the
independence objective shown below, an orthogonality objective was ex-
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plored in [145] for recommending Twitter users to follow. In this work, item
features were represented together with user and item interactions in a ten-
sor. Projections were produced such that the remaining dimensions were
orthogonal to sensitive features in the tensor. A more indirect approach
to enhancing fairness through regularization was explored in [27] where the
weights learned by the SLIM algorithm [105] are controlled to prevent seg-
regated item neighborhoods. A bandit-oriented approach was introduced in
[30] with the notion of fair regret used to guide the learning process. A sub-
modular diversity-enhancing objective for news recommendation was used
in [8] to provide greater coverage of information sources.
An interesting C-fairness question has to do with balancing outcomes
across users over time. This problem was introduced by Qian et al. with
SCRAM, a system to recommend places for picking-up passengers to taxi
drivers [117]. The system attempts to recommend routes to drivers so that
they are not concentrated in a small number of locations and so that the
revenue among drivers is balanced.
7.3 Fairness through Statistical Independence
In this section, the term fairness means that specific sensitive information
is not exploited when generating recommendation outcomes. For example,
when recommending jobs, if information about a job applicant’s gender does
not influence their recommendation outcome, the outcome can be consid-
ered fair in a sense that the socially sensitive information is not abused to
determine what jobs are recommended. Hereafter, we represent such infor-
mation to be ignored by a variable, which is called a sensitive feature. This
type of fairness was first discussed in [111]
There are several formal definitions of fairness, which are distinguished
by how a recommendation outcome is influenced by a sensitive feature. We
first introduce these formal definitions of fairness, and then show applica-
tions of this concept for solving real problems. Finally, we will introduce
algorithms to enhance fairness in a recommendation context.
7.3.1 Formal Definitions
Consider an event in which all the information required to make a recommen-
dation, such as the specifications of a user and item and all features related
to them, is provided and a recommendation outcome is inferred from the
information. This event is represented by a triplet of three random vari-
ables: Y , Z, and Q. Y represents the feedback of a user, which is typically
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a rating value or an indicator of whether or not a specified item is relevant.
Z stands for a sensitive feature. Finally, Q represents all (ordinary) fea-
tures related to this event other than those represented by Y and Z. The
recommender system needs to predict a feedback for an item for which an
active user has not yet give a feedback. We call such a predicted feedback a
recommendation outcome, denoted by Yˆ .
Many metrics to quantify fairness have been developed [147], and it is un-
realistic to enumerate these notions here. Instead, we introduce the mathe-
matical conditions that these metrics are designed to represent. For example,
the difference and the ratio between the probabilities conditioned by distinct
sensitive values, Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=0]−Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=1]→ 0 and Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=0]/Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=1]→
1, are proposed as metrics for measuring fairness. If these metrics take their
corresponding target value, a mathematical condition of the statistical in-
dependence between, Yˆ and Z, Yˆ ⊥ Z, is satisfied. Note that A ⊥ B,
denotes the (unconditional) independence between variables A and B, and
A ⊥ B | C denotes the conditional independence between A and B given
C.
Now, we enumerate three major formal conditions of fairness. The first
one is conditional independence between Yˆ and Z given Q, Yˆ ⊥ Z | Q. This
condition is related to notions called by direct fairness or disparate treatment
in a literature of fairness-aware machine learning. The recommendation is
made by inferring the value of Yˆ given the values of Z and Q based on
a probabilistic recommendation model, Pr[Yˆ |Z,Q]. It might appear that
the model could be made independent by simply removing Z, but this is
not the case. By removing the sensitive information, the model satisfies
the condition Pr[Yˆ |Z,Q] = Pr[Yˆ |Q]. Using this equation, the probability
distribution over (Y,Z,Q) leads conditional independence, Yˆ ⊥ Z | Q.
Pr[Yˆ , Z,Q] = Pr[Yˆ |Z,Q] Pr[Z|Q] Pr[Q] = Pr[Yˆ |Q] Pr[Z|Q] Pr[Q].
Under this condition, if there are features inQ that are not independent of Z,
the outcomes will be influenced by Z through the non-independent features.
For example, even though no information about job-applicants’ race was
explicitly exploited, their home address may contains information about
race if residential segregation exists in their home city. Such an indirect
influence is called a red-lining effect [28].
The second condition is unconditional independence between Yˆ and Z,
Yˆ ⊥ Z. This is related to notions known as statistical parity, indirect
fairness, and disparate impact. Unlike the first condition, the indirect in-
fluence of a sensitive feature, as well as its direct influence, can be removed
36
Ŷ = 1
S = 0
Ŷ = 0
Ŷ = 1
Ŷ = 0
S = 1
(a) Yˆ ⊥ Z
Ŷ = 1
S = 0
Ŷ = 0
Ŷ = 1Ŷ = 0
S = 1
Y = 0 Y = 1
Y = 0 Y = 1
(b) Yˆ ⊥ Z | Y
Figure 5: Distributions of the predicted ratings for each sensitive value
by satisfying this independence condition. From a viewpoint of information
theory, this condition equivalent to the condition that mutual information
between Yˆ and Z is zero. This means that we know nothing about Yˆ even
if we obtain information about Z. Figure 5(a) illustrates the case both an
outcome and a sensitive feature are binary variables. Ratios of Yˆ=0 to Yˆ=1
(depicted by black areas) in the upper and lower figures should be matched
to satisfy this type of fairness.
The final condition is conditional independence between Yˆ and Z given
Y , Yˆ ⊥ Z | Y . This is related to notions known as equal opportunity and
disparate mistreatment [60]. In the above two conditions, feedback from
users is assumed to be potentially unfair. For example, minority individuals
may be more poorly rated than their actual ability in job recommendation,
and it is therefore unreasonable to assume that this data is fair and reli-
able [144]. This condition indicates that an error of a prediction, Yˆ , against
an observation, Y , is not influenced by a sensitive feature, Z. Even if feed-
backs are fair, prediction errors can be influenced by a sensitive feature due
to the inductive bias of a prediction algorithm. Such influence can be re-
moved by satisfying this condition. Figure 5(b) visualizes this condition:
ratios of Y=1 to Yˆ=1 (depicted by black areas) in the upper and lower
figures should be matched.
7.4 Implementing Fairness through Independence
We here introduce recommendation algorithms that enhance three types of
fairness in the previous section. First, we discuss Yˆ ⊥ Z | Q. Basically,
this condition can be satisfied simply by removing a sensitive information
from a prediction model. We here introduce a model for predicting how the
popularity of a movie (i.e. the number of views) increases if it has earned
an award [12]. In this case, a sensitive feature corresponds to whether or
not a movie won any awards. The increase of movie’s popularity is assumed
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to be the difference between the popularity of awarded and non-awarded
movies. If a sensitive feature is sufficiently independent from movie’s other
features, this assumption would be valid, and this model becomes free from
a red-lining effect.
We next move on to the second condition, Yˆ ⊥ Z. We have developed
two approaches to enhance this type of fairness. The first regularization
approach is originally proposed for classification [83]. This approach adopts
a regularizer imposing a constraint of independence while training a recom-
mendation model [77]. A basic form of an objective function is
loss(Y, Yˆ )− η indep(Yˆ , Z) + λ reg,
where loss(·) is an empirical loss and reg is a regularizer to avoid overfitting.
indep(·) is an independence term, and it takes the larger value if an out-
come is fairer. An independence parameter, η, controls the balance between
prediction accuracy and fairness. We define D(s) as a subset consisting of
all training data whose sensitive feature takes s. Our first efficient indepen-
dence term [78] is mean matching, which is designed to match means of two
datasets, D(0) and D(1),
−
(
mean(D(0))−mean(D(1))
)2
.
However, this term ignores the second moment of rating distributions. We
developed two independence terms that can take the second moments into
account [81]. The one term is distribution matching with Bhattacharyya
distance,
−
(
− ln
∫ √
Pr[Yˆ |Z=0] Pr[Yˆ |Z=1]dYˆ
)
,
which measures the distance between two distributions, Pr[Yˆ |Z=0] and
Pr[Yˆ |Z=1], in Bhattacharyya distance. The other term is mutual infor-
mation with normal distributions,
−
(
H(Yˆ )−∑z Pr[Z=z] H(Yˆ |Z=z)),
where H(·) is a differential entropy function for the normal distribution.
We here demonstrate the effect of this fairness enhancement. Figure 6
shows the distributions of predicted ratings for movies. In this example, a
sensitive feature represents whether or not a movie was released before 1990.
Black and gray bars show the distributions of ratings for older and newer
movies, respectively. In Figure 6(a), ratings are predicted by a standard
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Figure 6: Distributions of the predicted ratings for each sensitive value
algorithm, and older movies are highly rated (note the large gaps between
the two bars indicated by arrowheads). When fairness is enhanced as in
Figure 6(b), the distributions of ratings for older and newer movies become
much closer (the large gaps are lessened); that is to say, the predicted ratings
are less affected by the release year of the movie.
The second approach of enhancing independence between Yˆ and Z is
a model-based approach [79]. In this approach, a probabilistic generative
model for collaborative filtering [61] is extended,
Pr[Q,Y ] =
∑
W Pr[Q|W ] Pr[W |Y ] Pr[Y ].
where W is a latent variable, which is introduced to reduce its model com-
plexity. To this model, we add a sensitive feature so that the feature is
independent from an outcome variable:
Pr[Q,Y, Z] =
∑
W
Pr[Q|W,Z] Pr[W |Y,Z] Pr[Y ] Pr[Z]
= Pr[Q|Y,Z] Pr[Y ] Pr[Z]
In our experiment, this approach was inferior to the above regularization
approach in terms of fairness, because the assumption of this model is unre-
alistic. Independence between Yˆ and Z is satisfied if a predicted outcome is
assumed to be probabilistically following a distribution represented by this
model. However, an actual outcome is an expectation of Pr[Yˆ |Q,Z], which
is deterministically generated [80]. This discrepancy between the model’s
assumption and an actual condition worsens fairness.
The third type of fairness is Yˆ ⊥ Z | Y is considered in [140]. The
proposed approach is similar to the above regularization approach, but an
independence term is replaced with absolute unfairness. Item sets are di-
vided into two sensitive groups each of which shares the same sensitive value,
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and these are indicated by S = 0 and S = 1. The first inner absolute value
is the difference between means of predicted outcomes for a specific user
over the two item groups. The second inner absolute value is the difference
between means of observed outcomes. This absolute unfairness A measures
the dissimilarity between these two differences.
dpred =
∣∣meanS=0[Yˆuser]−meanS=1[Yˆuser]∣∣
dobs =
∣∣meanS=0[Yuser]−meanS=1[Yuser]∣∣
A = meanuser
∣∣dpred − dobs∣∣
7.5 Summary
Fairness in recommender systems has a variety of meanings. The C-fairness
criterion is that individuals or groups should not get different recommenda-
tions when all else is equal except their protected group identity. Another
definition is how the recommender system should create a balanced repre-
sentation of different items belonging to different item providers (P-fairness)
in order to maintain fairness when providers might belong to a protected
group. Fairness is a St consideration: a case where the system has a particu-
lar targeting objective different from individual stakeholders, who might be
assumed just to seek the best outcomes for themselves. In this section, we
have surveyed some of the recent work in the area and examined in depth
approaches based on enhancing fairness as defined in terms of statistical
independence.
8 Methodological Issues
At this point in the development of multistakeholder recommendation re-
search, there is a diversity of methodological approaches and little agreement
on basic questions of evaluation. In part, this is a reflection of the diver-
sity of problems that fall under the multistakeholder umbrella. It should be
noted that evaluation can be both formative and summative in recommender
systems research: we evaluate in order to improve systems, choosing “the
best” among different algorithmic variants and parameter settings. We also
evaluate in order to show the impact (or more often the predicted impact)
of our system on its stakeholders.
A key difficulty is the limited availability of real-world data with mul-
tistakeholder characteristics. The reason for this becomes clear if we con-
sider the experiments shown in Section 6.3. The data that makes these
experiments possible is highly business-critical, including such data as the
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margins associated with each provider and the variable commissions nego-
tiated by the platform. It is unlikely that an organization would be able
to share this kind of data with outside researchers. Some researchers have
obtained proprietary data for multistakeholder research, but progress in the
field requires replicable experiments that proprietary data does not support.
Areas of multistakeholder research that involve public, rather than private,
benefit may offer advantages in terms of the availability of data: see, for
example, the data sets available from the crowd-funded educational charity
site DonorsChoose.org2.
8.1 Simulation
In the absence of real-world data with associated valuations, researchers
have typically turned to simulations as in Section 6.1.1 above. Simulated
or inferred provider data is useful for transforming publicly-available rec-
ommendation data sets in standard user, item, rating format into ones that
can be used for multistakeholder experimentation. The experiments in [127]
provide an example of this methodology: each item in the MovieLens 1M
data set was assigned to a random provider, and the distribution of utili-
ties calculated. To capture different market conditions, the experimenters
use two different probability distributions: normal and power-law. There
is no accepted standard for producing such simulations and what are rea-
sonable assumptions regarding the distribution of provider utilities or the
formulation of system utilities, except in special cases.
Researchers have also used objective aspects of data sets to infer proxy
attributes for multistakeholder evaluation. In [24] where the first organi-
zation listed in the production credits for each movie was treated as the
provider – a significant over-simplification of what is a very complex system
of revenue distribution in the movie industry. In other work, global metrics
such as network centrality [10] have been used to represent system utility
for the purposes of multistakeholder evaluation. [26] demonstrated an al-
ternate approach to generate synthetic attribute data based on behavioral
characteristics that can be used to evaluate system-level fairness properties.
More sophisticated treatments of profitability and recommendation are
to be found in the management and e-commerce literature, some using public
data as seen in [106, 34, 4], but these techniques and associated data sets
have not yet achieved wide usage in the recommender system community.
2https://data.donorschoose.org/explore-our-impact/
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8.2 Models of utility
A multistakeholder framework inherently involves the comparison of out-
comes across different groups of individuals that receive different kinds of
benefits from the system. In economic terms, this entails utility calculation
and comparison. As with data, different researchers have made different
assumptions about what types of utilities accrue from a recommender sys-
tem and how they are to be measured. A standard assumption is that the
output of a recommendation algorithm can be treated as approximations of
user utility. Yet, research has confirmed that users prefer diverse recommen-
dation lists [116], a factor in tension with accuracy-based estimates of user
utility.
Most of the examples discussed above, focus solely on the short-term
perspective. More research is therefore required to understand the potential
positive and negative long-term effects of profit-aware recommendation and
other strategies that are not strictly user-focused. Future models could also
consider the price sensitivity and willingness-to-pay of individual consumers
in the recommendation process.
8.3 Off-line experiment design
A standard off-line experimental design in recommender systems is the cre-
ation of multiple folds of training and test data from a data set using random
fixed-sized partitioning of user profiles. The benefit of this approach is that
each partition contains a fixed proportion of each user’s profile, guaranteeing
a minimum profile size for recommendation generation. This makes sense
when user outcomes are the highest priority, as it ensures that an evaluation
data point can be produced for every user in every fold. All of recommenda-
tions for a test fold are produced, in some sense, simultaneously, as a set of
recommendation lists or rating predictions to which evaluation metrics can
be applied.
This experimental framework makes a bit less sense in a multistakeholder
context, and this is where the essential asymmetry of the stakeholders comes
into play. Providers are, in a key sense, passive – they have to wait until users
arrive at the system in order to have an opportunity to be recommended.
The randomized cross-fold methodology measures what the system can do
for each user, given a portion of their profile data, the potential benefit
to be realized if the user visits and a recommendation list is generated.
Evaluating the provider side under the same conditions, while a commonly-
used methodology, lacks a similar justification.
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A more realistic methodology from the provider’s point of view is a tem-
poral one, that takes into account the history of the system up to a certain
time point and examines how provider utilities are realized in subsequent
time periods. See [29] for a comprehensive discussion of time-aware recom-
mender systems evaluation. However, time-aware methods have their own
difficulties, forcing the system to cope with cold-start issues possibly outside
of the scope of a given project’s aims.
8.4 User studies
User studies are another instrument available to researchers that has not
been extensively applied to multistakeholder recommender systems. As
usual for such studies, the development of reliable experimental designs is
challenging as the participants’ decision situation typically remains artifi-
cial. Furthermore, as in the study by Azaria et al. discussed above [14],
familiarity biases might exist – in their study participants were willing to
pay more for movies that they already knew – which have been observed
for other types user studies in the recommender systems domain [72]. Ulti-
mately, more field tests – even though they are typically tied to a specific
domain and specific business model – are needed that give us more insights
into the effects of multistakeholder recommendations in the real world.
8.5 Evaluation Metrics
The building block of the multistakeholder evaluation is to first measure
the utility each of the stakeholders gets within a recommendation platform.
Common evaluation metrics such as RMSE, precision, NDCG, diversity,
etc. are all different ways to evaluate the performance of a recommender
system from the user’s perspective. As noted above, these measures are
implicitly a form of system utility measure as well: system designers opti-
mize for such measures under the assumptions that (1) higher evaluation
metrics correspond to higher user satisfaction and (2) higher user satisfac-
tion contributes to higher system utility through customer retention, trust
in the recommendation provided, etc. However, the formulation of multi-
stakeholder recommendation makes it possible to characterize and evaluate
system utility explicitly.
Typically, evaluation metrics are averaged over all users to generate a
point score indicating the central tendency over all users. However, it is also
the case that in a multistakeholder environment additional aspects of the
utility distribution may be of interest. For example, in an e-commerce con-
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text, providers who receive low utility may leave the eco-system, suggesting
that the variance of provider utility may be important as well as the mean.
One suggested practice would be to report the first three moments of the
distribution of utilities for each shareholder – the mean, variance, and skew-
ness – rather than just the mean value when reporting on multistakeholder
evaluations.
8.5.1 Provider metrics
When evaluating the utility of a recommender system for a particular provider,
we may take several different stances. One views the recommender as a way
to garner user attention. In this case, the relevance of an item to a user
may be a secondary consideration. Another perspective views the recom-
mender as a source of potential leads. In this view, recommending an item
to uninterested users is of little benefit to the provider. In the first situation,
simply counting (with or without a rank-based discount) the number of times
a provider’s products appears in recommendation lists would be sufficient.
In the second situation, the metric should count only those recommenda-
tions that were considered “hits”, those that appear positively rated in the
corresponding test data.
Another provider consideration may be the reach of its recommended
products across the user population. A metric could count the number of
unique users to whom the provider’s items are recommended. As noted in
the discussion above the distinction between the P− and P+ multistake-
holder configurations lies precisely in the providers’ ability to target specific
audiences for their items. In a P+ system, it would make sense to consider
reach relative to the target population. For example, in an online dating
application where the user can specify desired properties in a match, an
evaluation metric might be the fraction out of the target audience receiving
the recommendation.
Finally, where the consideration is the accuracy of system’s predictions,
we can create a provider-specific summary statistic of a measure like RMSE.
[41] uses this method to examine differences in error when recommending
books by male and female authors. Since the statistic by itself is not that
useful for a single provider, a better metric would indicate the provider’s
position relative to other providers in the overall distribution
Table 4 shows example metrics for each of the provider cases. Note that
these metrics can be normalized in different ways. For example, the count-
oriented metrics may be normalized by the size of the provider catalog,
and / or by the number of users, etc. For simplicity, we omit a complete
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enumeration of all such variants here. Note also that a provider might be
interested in their rank or scoring relative to other providers. For example,
an Exposure value of 600 might be more meaningful if the provider is also
told that this value ranks 3rd across all providers or that it is 1.2 standard
deviations above the mean value.
Type Formula Explanation
Exposure(p)
∑
Li∈L
∑
j∈Li 1(j ∈ Ip) Count the number
of recommenda-
tions given across
all of p’s items.
Hits(p)
∑
Li∈L
∑
j∈Li 1(j ∈ Ip ∧ rij ∈ T )Count the number
of hits in recom-
mendation lists for
all of p’s items.
Reach(p)
∑
Li∈L 1(|Ip ∩ Li| > 0) Count how many
users get at least
one ip item recom-
mended.
TargetReach(p)
∑
Li∈L 1(|Ip ∩ Li| > 0 ∧ gp(i)) Count how many
users in p’s tar-
get set get at least
one ip item recom-
mended.
PAccuracy(p,m) [
∑
rij∈Tp m(rij , rˆij)]/|Tp| Average metric m
score for predic-
tions of p’s items.
Table 4: Examples of provider metrics. Let p be a given provider, and ip ∈ Ip
an item associated with p. Let L = L0, L1, ..., Ln be the recommendation
lists calculated for n users. Let T be set of rij ratings in the test set over
which L is calculated. Let Tp be provider p’s subset of T : Tp = {rij : rij ∈
T ∧ i ∈ Ip}. Let 1 be the indicator function. Let m(rij , rˆij) be an accuracy-
oriented evaluation metric (such as RMSE) that evaluates a predicted rating
rˆij relative to a known value rij ∈ T . Let gp(i) be a boolean function that
returns true if user i is in the target market of provider p.
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8.5.2 System metrics
As noted above, the system utility may in many cases be a simple aggrega-
tion of the utilities of other parties, the Sa case. For example, in a simple
commission-oriented arrangement, the profit to the system might be some
weighted aggregate of the Hits metric, taking item price and commission
rate into account. However, other cases arise where the system has its own
targeted utility framework that is not a simple aggregate of those of users
or providers. This is the St case.
An important St context is algorithmic fairness discussed in Section 7.
In general, we should not expect that providers will care if the system is
fair to others as long as it provides them with good outcomes. Any fair-
ness considerations and related metrics will therefore be ones defined by
system considerations. For example, we can define our provider metrics
to map to providers with and without sensitive features, and P (Y = 1) as
Reach(p)/|L|. Then, a proportional impact metric such as Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=0]/Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=1]
can be defined to see how closely a particular set of recommendation results
tracks the desired fairness outcome where this ratio approaches 1.
Other discussions of system utilities are relatively sparse in the mul-
tistakeholder recommendation literature. As noted in Section 6.2 above,
considerations such as customer lifetime value are candidates for St metrics,
as they are not simply reducible to the utilities of other stakeholders. Some
of the applications discussed below, such as educational recommendation,
also present some interesting challenging for defining and applying system
metrics.
9 Research Directions
While there are a number of examples of notable research results in mul-
tistakeholder recommendation, a number of important unsolved challenges
remain. In this section, we examine some important research directions in
which we expect future progress.
9.1 Algorithms
As noted above, existing work has explored some algorithmic approaches to
multistakeholder recommendation. Two approaches can be identified: the
first situates the multistakeholder problem within the core recommendation
generation function as a type of multi-objective optimization, the second ap-
plies multistakeholder considerations after an initial set of recommendations
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has been generated.
The multi-objective approach, typified by the work discussed here in
Section 7.4, builds a loss function that incorporates multiple objectives and
attempts to learn a recommendation function that is sensitive both to a
standard accuracy-oriented objective, which can be understood as a Cp con-
sideration, and to an objective that is oriented towards some other stake-
holder. In Section 7.4, this is a fairness objective belonging to the system.
Important research challenges remain in formulating and applying multiple
objectives across the wide range of multistakeholder applications.
The second algorithm type, as demonstrated in 6.3, is one that employs
an existing recommendation algorithm to generate recommendations (again,
this is understood as the user-oriented aspect of the system) and then other
stakeholders’ considerations are integrated through a re-ranking process.
Such systems have the benefit of being modular, so that improvements can
be made and analyzed for each part of the algorithm separately. Researchers
have built on existing work in information retrieval such as MMR [85] and
xQuad [98] as well as constraint satisfaction [127] and probabilistic soft
logic [44]. We expect multistakeholder-oriented re-ranking will remain an
important research direction for the field.
One discernible trend in algorithmic research in recommender systems
has been the move from narrower objectives for recommendation algorithms
to broader ones. Initially, point-wise accuracy metrics were developed, which
evolved into pair-wise and list-wise metrics, and more recently to considering
interactions extended in time. Multistakeholder recommendation raises the
possibility of broadening the objective yet again towards optimizing over the
entire set of recommendations delivered. The approach in [127] is one step
in this direction, as it formulates the re-ranking problem as approximating
constraint satisfaction over all of the recommendation lists generated for the
test data. While the interactive requirements of recommendation may seem
to argue against the computation of a global optimum, many applications
generate and cache recommendations and would be a good match for this
kind of algorithm.
9.2 Applications
The pattern of multistakeholder recommendation can be observed in variety
of different applications. The prior discussion has highlighted existing re-
search in the reciprocal domains of job recommendation and online dating,
in the value-aware environments in e-commerce and multisided platforms,
and in the environments where fairness considerations apply. There are
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many additional areas of application for multistakeholder recommendation,
some of which are listed here.
Education: Depending on the environment, recommendation of educa-
tional content may have a multistakeholder aspect. For example, there
may be tension between the interests of students who want to pursue
familiar content and those of the educational system that may be in-
terested in producing students with a well-rounded range of experi-
ences. When multiple educational providers are involved, there may
be provider considerations as well [23]. Sector: 〈C∗p , P−∗ , St〉
Philanthropy: Commerce-oriented multisided platforms are obvious ex-
amples where multistakeholder considerations are important. How-
ever, there are also multisided platforms that have philanthropic aims.
The crowd-sourced microlending platform Kiva.org is such an example
where fairness-aware recommendation has been applied [27]. Sector:
〈C∗p , P−n , St〉
Tourism: Another example of recommender systems involving multiple
stakeholders is tourism. For example when a travel recommender sys-
tem recommends a destination or a travel package to a user, the stake-
holders that are involved include the traveler, the airlines (or any other
transportation provider), the host (destination) and also the system.
The hotel recommendation system in Section 6.3 shows some of the
multisided nature of interactions in travel. Peer-to-peer travel ser-
vices like AirBnB may also have reciprocal aspects. Sector: Sector:
〈C∗p , P ∗∗ , Sa〉
News recommendation: News recommendation can be viewed as strictly
a matter of personalizing for user taste, but there are considerations –
such as public service goals or regulatory requirements – that might re-
quire fairness, balance or other system objectives. Sector: 〈C∗p , P−n , St〉
Social media: In social media platforms, users get a variety of different
content merged as a ranked content stream, that can be understood
as a set of recommendations. For example, on Facebook, users get
friends’ posts as one type of recommendation and ads as another type.
Thus, we have multiple types of providers and a task of balancing
the content of the feed so that multiple objectives are met. Sector:
〈C∗p , P−∗ , Sa,t〉
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As this set makes clear, the scope of multistakeholder recommendation
is quite broad and incorporates systems of societal importance. It may be
inevitable that, as recommender systems move further into applications with
more significant stakes for individuals and society, it becomes more and more
necessary that they serve a multiplicity of purposes, something that cannot
be achieved with a strict focus on the end user.
9.3 Explanation / Transparency
Exploring how recommendation explanation could be done in a multistake-
holder environment is also another direction for future research. Explanation
is an important factor in recommendation interfaces, helping users under-
stand how a given recommendation relates to their interests. It has been
shown that explanations can enhance users’ likelihood of adopting a given
recommendation.
Multistakeholder recommendation poses some interesting challenges for
recommendation explanation. First, there is the issue of complexity: a rec-
ommendation produced by a multistakeholder system will, by necessity, be
one that incorporates multiple factors in its production, and therefore any
explanation will be more complex than what would be needed if user pref-
erences were the only consideration. In addition, there is the fact that the
objectives of some of the other stakeholders may be in conflict with those
of the user. In some contexts, one could imagine users finding it objection-
able that their preferences are being downplayed in favor of others’ interests.
E-commerce sites that confront this problem often label items in recommen-
dation lists as “promoted” or “sponsored” when they are being displayed
because of provider consideration. It is more difficult to do this when a
global optimization algorithm is being applied, as all results will potentially
be influenced by the full set of stakeholders. Producing acceptable explana-
tions in such contexts is an interesting challenge, but a good solution may
be necessary to make multistakeholder recommendations broadly useful.
10 Conclusion
Multistakeholder recommendation is an important development in the evo-
lution of the recommender systems field, as researchers widen their view
of those impacted by the results recommender systems produce. This is
a natural progression from the initial academic research prototypes to to-
day’s fielded systems, key elements of online applications, with millions of
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users. It is not surprising that systems occupying key positions in complex
commercial and social environments should have to answer to many masters.
While multistakeholder issues have surfaced regularly in the history of
recommender systems research, the recognition of common threads and re-
search questions has been a more recent occurrence. This article has pre-
sented a synthesis of the landscape of this research past and present, demon-
strated some important current applications, and raised important questions
for future investigation.
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